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Abstract

Even though broadband high speed Internet service has been always attractive choice to Internet users, its
deployment has not been very successful. Until very recently most broadband access providers offer a single
quality level and price. We propose a definition of Quality of Service (QoS) in a broadband network, present
a measurement of the proposed QoS, and discuss its implementability. Further, we show that the idea of
contingency pricing can in fact be applied meaningfully to broadband services to assure customers for high
quality service. This paper presents our initial work towards a proposal for broadband pricing that addresses
the dimension of QoS uncertainty in the context of QoS based pricing, and is designed to be consistent with the
technical aspects of data flow and communications infrastructure for broadband service. Our future plans
include further development of technical aspects and economic analysis of the proposed QoS and contingent
pricing scheme in broadband high speed Internet services.
Keywords: Contingency pricing, quality of service, price discrimination, broadband services.

Motivation
Quality-differentiated pricing, or market segmentation, is a widely used pricing strategy which can yield economic benefits to
both sellers and consumers. In the case of Internet access and data transport services, quality-of-service based pricing is considered
essential to prevent free riding problems and generate an efficient utilization of the Internet. In the last twenty years, several
technical and economic proposals for QoS-based pricing have been introduced, but none widely adopted especially for consumeroriented services such as broadband Internet access services which offer high-speed and always-on connectivity. Thus, until very
recently most broadband access providers offer a single quality level (for home users, at about $45 a month). This policy has
limited the adoption of broadband services, because customers who care only about always-on connectivity are not willing to pay
the high price for high-speed access.
One critical aspect of quality and pricing for Internet services is the inherent stochasticity in performance level delivered to a user
at any time, caused by the best-effort delivery and shared resource utilization in the TCP/IP protocols (up to IPv4). Efforts to
introduce QoS-based pricing have focused on reservation of bandwidth for high-priority traffic, differential allocation of capacities
for different segments of customers, and weighted routing algorithms. Still, the inherent resource-sharing in packet-switched
networks means that throughput rates can only be guaranteed upto some probability of failure. There are also other sources of
quality uncertainty, including equipment failure and lack of end-to-end control over resources as shown in Figure 1: an ISP is
responsible for traffic and delays between its headend and each end-user’s cable modem, but not from the headend to the Internet.
In general, most broadband providers offer customers a vague promise of maximum throughput rates, which has little value
because communication capacity to the provider system is shared between users.
In the past few months, most broadband providers have announced an intent to offer tiered pricing (Spring 2002). Weber (2002)
reported a test for tiered pricing by Cox Communications in Las Vegas (adding a 256kbps tier for $26.95 to their high-speed,
$40/month, service). Spring (2002) reports that several broadband ISPs (Comcast, Charter Communications, Cox, Rogers Cable)
are testing tiered pricing in some areas. Introduction of tiered pricing is critical to the future of broadband, which is characterized
today by excessive capacity and lower-than-predicted demand (for example, Odlyzko (2001) reports that while industry decisions
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were based on a doubling of Internet traffic every 100 days, in fact traffic has doubled only once a year since 1996, leading to
a true annual growth rate of only 100% against an expectation of a 700% annual growth rate).

Figure 1. Network Diagram between End Users and Internet
However, introduction of tiered pricing is problematic under QoS uncertainty (potential customers of the higher QoS levels have
no incentive to pay the high price unless they can be assured better service) unless the pricing scheme builds in a rigorous
mechanism for dealing with quality uncertainty. This is aggravated by the fact that high- and low-value consumers of broadband
service have a shared communication channel to the service provider.
This paper presents our initial work towards a proposal for broadband pricing that addresses the dimension of QoS uncertainty
in the context of QoS based pricing, and is designed to be consistent with the technical aspects of data flow and communications
infrastructure for broadband service. The proposal builds on recent changes in broadband communication standards and recent
work of Bhargava and Sundaresan (2000, 2002) who have proposed quality-contingent pricing for IT services characterized by
quality uncertainty.

Broadband Service Quality
This section covers three related aspects of broadband pricing: how a broadband service provider can provide differential
treatment to users based on their payment levels, how she can examine or analyze the profitability of the proposed pricing scheme,
and what kind of quality assurance under uncertainty and quality measurement & guarantees must accompany a tiered pricing
approach.

Differential Traffic Control
To implement a tiered pricing policy, a broadband network must be able to offer differential treatment to different categories of
users. We discuss two recent proposals in this regard and then offer an alternative approach based on recent changes in industry
standards.
Anderson, Kelly, and Steinberg (2002) study a contractual scheme of bandwidth sharing under the congestion marking system
supported by the Internet standard on Explicit Congestion Notification (Ramakrishnan, Floyd, and Black 2001). They argue that
the proposed “Contract and Balancing Process” can be used as a means of sharing bandwidth in Internet network. This approach
is attractive to Internet backbone providers, however we are not convinced that it can be implemented between an ISP and end
users because end users usually do not reserve their dedicated bandwidth in advance. Stahl, Dai, and Whinston (2001) study the
optimal pricing strategy of end users and the optimal allocation decision of the ISP under the Diffserv architecture and the leaky126
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bucket (Kuroso and Ross 2001) routing system. They demonstrate that the leaky-bucket approach can not outperform the usagebased pricing structure (i.e., the leaky-bucket approach can not achieve the social optimal allocation of network resources).
However, this approach models the Internet as a single node and assumes that there is no uncertainty in the network.
We propose an alternative scheme for differential treatment, inspired by the broadband industry’s newest technology specification
Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) 1.1. This standard specifies the functions of the cable provider’s Cable
Modem Termination System (CMTS) and the end users’ cable modems. Under DOCSIS 1.1, a broadband ISP can assign different
service treatments to different customers (for detailed information, see Motorola (2001) and CableLabs Staffs (2001)). Unlike
the old control specifications (prior to DOCSIS 1.1, the control mechanisms, typically maximum throughput rate, were installed
at each cable modem), the management of different allocation of the routing capacity is controlled by the CMTS.

Economic Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Under the recently announced tiered pricing strategy of broadband ISPs, QoS is promised but it may not be delivered to end users.
Moreover, currently there is no rigorous contractual scheme to handle non-performance. The literature on quality uncertainty
offers approaches such as money-back guarantees, warranties, and trial periods (see Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995)). In a recent
paper, Bhargava and Sundaresan (2000, 2002) propose a quality-contingent pricing scheme and argue that it is especially attractive
in the context of IT services. Since the performance can be determined only after using the broadband service, this service can
not be returned or repaired, making money-back guarantees and warranties infeasible. Therefore, we build an economic model
for our proposal based on Bhargava and Sundaresan (2000, 2002)’s contingency pricing proposal.
We consider an ISP who adopts a contingency pricing scheme with multiple contracts (Ri, Ri): a customer contracts a broadband
service at price Ri, and the customer receives a rebate (Ri) if the guaranteed QoS is not delivered. We assume that the ISP has
equipment to measure packet delay continuously in small time intervals (e.g., millisecond, second, etc.) for each user. We focus
on downstream performance, though the same idea can also be applied to upstream data flow. Since we consider the guarantee
within the infrastructure that the ISP is responsible for, we treat the Internet as a single node that sends traffic, destined for specific
users, to the ISP.
The ISP’s QoS guarantee is only responsible for her own network (i.e., between CMTS to the end users) and consists of two parts
(mqi, yqi): given a certain time period, yqi % of packets will be delivered less than mqi milliseconds. Therefore, for the downstream
performance, a packet arrival time is stamped at the CMTS, and the corresponding service completion time is measured at the
end user’s cable modem. We assume that performance is measured by a trusted third party or using equipment & software that
has been verified by a trusted agency.
We assume that the ISP serves multiple classes of customers; for example, casual users with email and I-chat, heavy users with
multimedia users and large office documents, etc. We also assume that all members in a class share an independent and identical
distribution for the number of packet requested per usage (i.e., X ~ Poisson (λ i ) ), a distribution for the number of usage during
a time period (i.e., Z ~ Poisson ( µ i ) ), and an identical valuation for a packet ( α i ) and valuation for the Always-On feature. We
note that two main benefits of the broadband services are Always-On feature and High Speed communication. Therefore, expected
net surplus of a customer in class i is

E [U i ] = v i + E [ Utility of High Speed] - ( R i − E [ Rebate])
where Ui is the customer’s net surplus and vi is the customer’s valuation for the Always-On feature. Let h (⋅) be the probability
density function of the ISP’s performance (this function can be estimated from the industry data or appropriate simulation model).
Then, we have
y

E[U i ] = v i + E[ Utility of High Speed] - ( R i − ∫0 h (⋅) dy )
Now, we derive the customer’s expected utility from the High Speed feature. We model this utility as linearly correlated to the
customer’s packet value and total number of packets, but the customer incurs disutility due to the network delay. Considering
these, we have
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Zi

Zi

i =1

i =1

E[ Utility of High Speed] = E[α i ∑ X i ] − β E[α i ∑ X i E[ m a ]]
= α i λ i µ i − βα i λi µ i E[ m a ]
where $ is a delay constant per unit time. Therefore, a customer in class i will take the contract as long as her net surplus is greater
than 0. Specifically,
y

E[U i ] = v i + α i λ i µ i − βα i λ i µ i E[ m a ] - ( R i − ∫0 h (⋅) dy ) ≥ 0
Here we report our preliminary results from a special case of our proposed contingency pricing scheme where there is only one
customer class. Under this case, it is obvious that the ISP will choose a contract so that the customers’ net surplus is equal to 0.
Hence, we have the ISP’s profit as
y

π ( Ri , m qi , y qi ) = N i ( Ri − ∫0 h (⋅) dy )
= N i (v i + α i λ i µ i − βα i λ i µ i E[ m a ])
Given this profit function, we see the following results:
Proposition 1.

If there is only one customer class, then
a) the ISP should utilize all capacity to maximize the profit, and
b) as long as

y

∫0 h(⋅)dy =

v i + α i λ i µ i − βα i λ i µ i E[ m a ]
, any combination (Ri, mqi, yqi) generates an equal
Ri

profit.
We are currently attempting to extend our analysis to multiple classes of customer.

Applicability of Proposed QoS Guarantee
To answer whether the proposed QoS guarantee and measurement is practical, we need to answer several important issues for
the proposed scheme. These issues include implementability, verifiability, efficiency, and moral hazard problems from ISP and
end users.
Unlike the other specifications of broadband services, the new DOCSIS 1.1 provides broadband ISPs ability to set service levels
for different types of customers. Furthermore, the new DOCSIS 1.1 requires that CMTS handle this various allocations to end
users and store usage information. Therefore, our proposed measurement algorithm can be installed easily at CMTS. In terms of
each user’s cable modem, it will not be difficult or big burden to implement a system that captures packet delays of the end users.

Figure 2. Monitoring of QoS level between CMTS and Cable Modems
128
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To verify the QoS level, the ISP can install a machine between CMTS and all end users (see Figure 2). This machine can
communicate with CMTS and each cable modem in a certain time interval (e.g., 10 minutes, 30 minutes, or 1 hour, etc.) and
record both CMTS and each cable modem’s QoS information. This machine can be operated by third party to increase its
credibility.

Conclusion and Future Research Direction
In this paper, we study QoS for packet delay in broadband services. Specifically, we discuss the lack of QoS guarantee and the
need of rigorous contractual schemes in broadband network. Further, we show that the idea of contingency pricing can in fact be
applied meaningfully to broadband services to assure customers for high performance services. To this end, we propose a
definition of QoS for packet delay (by implication throughput rate) in broadband and a way of measurement of the QoS. By
separating the entire network communication into two parts (ISP controllable and uncontrollable), this QoS guarantee can be
adopted by broadband ISPs. Also due to the new DOCSIS 1.1, which enables an ISP to set different service levels to different
end users, our proposed QoS can be implemented easily.
In this paper, we limited our discussion to a definition of QoS for throughput rate in broadband network, a measurement of the
proposed QoS, and its implementability. Our future plans include further development of technical aspects and economic analysis
of the proposed QoS and contingent pricing scheme in broadband high speed Internet services.
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